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The propriety of a police officer's forcible entry into a dwelling to
arrest an individual on probable cause, absent exigent circumstances and
without a warrant, has been termed a "grave constitutional question" by
the United States Supreme Court.' Nevertheless, since Justice Harlan's
1957 characterization of the issue, the Court has not resolved 2 the tension
between the police practice of entry to effect a warrantless arrest and the
mandates of the fourth amendment.3 This lack of authoritative guidance
has contributed to an increasing conflict among lower courts on the
point.4 This comment surveys the development and current status of
forcible entries pursuant to a probable cause arrest, examines the applica-
ble policy arguments, and suggests a possible resolution.
i. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). The question of a warrantless
search of an individual's dwelling conducted on probable cause is more settled: the search is
per se unconstitutional absent certain well defined exigent circumstances. See note 13 infra.
2. There is dicta on both sides. Compare, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 477 (1971) ("[Wjarrantless entry of a man's house in order to arrest him on
probable cause is . . . in fundamental conflict with . . . the Fourth Amendment"), with
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963) ("[I]t has been recognized ... that . . . breaking
[of a suspect's door] is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances").
But these doctrines are confused and inconclusive. More often the Court has specifically
left the issue open. E.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 433 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 474-81.
3. The fourth amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Compare, e.g., United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th
Cir. 1970) (forbidding entry to effect a warrantless arrest absent exigent circumstances);
with People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972) (police may arrest at any time and any place
provided authority to arrest is lawful).
Other courts that have emulated the United States Supreme Court and resolved the
pertinent issue on other grounds have refused to enter this "obscure corner of search and
seizure law." People v. Ramey, 47 Cal. App. 3d 866, 871, 121 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40 (1975),
vacated, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
II. Early Arrest Standards and the Constitutional
Search-Arrest Dichotomy
Early American cases accepted the conclusions of common law
commentators, particularly Hale,5 that an officer could not only effect a
warrantless arrest in public, 6 but could break into a dwelling to so arrest.
7
This judgment was predicated on a survey of prior decisions8 and a
perception that the fourth amendment presented a dichotomy between
search and arrest warrant requirements. 9 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Rohan v. Sawin l0 espoused this concept and typified the judicial
consensus when it summarily assumed the propriety of the power to break
and arrest and added,
It has been sometime contended, that an arrest. . . with-
out a warrant, was a violation of the great fundamental princi-
ples of our national and state constitutions, forbidding un-
reasonable searches and arrests, except by warrant founded
upon a complaint made under oath. Those provisions doubtless
had another and different purpose, being in restraint of general
warrants to make searches, and requiring warrants to issue only
upon a complaint made under oath."
5. 2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 90-92 (first Amer. ed. 1847).
Hale's interpretation was not, however, uniformly accepted among early legal scholars.
E.g., E. COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 177 (1797); 2 W. HAWKINS,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 14, § 7 (1788). For a discussion of common law sources, see
Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
The difficulty inhered partially in attempting to reconcile the sanctity of a man's home
and the pre-eminent demands of the King. See Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH.
L. REV. 541, 800 (1924). Two maxims succinctly illustrated the dichotomy: "Every man's
house is his castle," BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS *417; and "The king's keys unlock all doors."
Wilgus, supra at 800. The former was strictly applicable only to civil actions, but its
cautionary impact, as in the knock rule, was substantial. In the vivid words of William Pitt,
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 379 (2d ed. 1953).
6. "The authority of a constable, to arrest without warrant, in cases of felony, is
most fully established by the elementary books, and adjudicated cases." Rohan v. Sawin, 59
Mass. 281, 284 (1851). See State v. Brown, 5 Del. 505 (5 Harr. 1853); Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend.
350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814).
7. "An officer who has the right to arrest without a warrant because he suspects on
reasonable grounds that the defendant has committed a felony, has the right to break open
doors." Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396,401,95 N.E. 868, 873 (1911); see Shanley
v. Wells, 71 111. 78 (1873); Smith v. Tate, 143 Tenn. 268, 227 S.W. 1026 (1921); Wilgus, supra
note 5, at 803. This right has consistently been conditioned on the officer's knock and
identification. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1648), quoted in Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958). "In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the
doors be not open) may break the party's house . . . if otherwise he cannot enter. But
before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open
doors .. " Such a demand remains substantially intact. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 46-59 (1963); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 120.6, Comment at
311-12 (Proposed Final Draft, 1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 95 N.E. 868 (1911).
9. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
10. 59 Mass. 281 (1850).
11. Id. at 284-85.
While the constitutional exegesis is doubtful, the court correctly
determined that the fourth amendment was primarily a response to the
indiscriminate employment of general writs.' 2 It was believed that by
specifying the necessities of probable cause, oath, and particularity, the
inequities of the writ system would be eliminated. With this historical
perspective, both the United States Supreme Court and lower federal and
state courts have continually ruled that although the fourth amendment
renders warrantless searches per se unreasonable,1 3 a warrantless arrest
on probable cause is permissible. 4 Thus, while the protection of the
citizen from unreasonable governmental intrusion constitutes the core of
the amendment,' 5 it is clear that the individual's property has been
accorded a greater quantum of this protection than his person.
The vehicle for this protection, prior judicial endorsement, is a
relatively modern concept,1 6 and its classic formulation was promulgated
in the following passage by Justice Jackson in 1948:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officers engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent.'
7
12. The writs granted virtually unrestricted authority to officials to conduct searches
at any location and time. They were employed primarily by customs officers in a decidedly
unsuccessful attempt to enforce the trade laws. Farrar, Aspects of Police Search and Seizure
Without Warrant in England and the United States, 29 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 491, 556 (1975).
13. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). The exceptions to this principle have been "jealously and carefully" guarded. Jones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). These exceptional circumstances that permit a
warrantless search have developed along the following four lines: (1) consent, see Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); (2) the search incident to arrest, see Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); (3) the search of a mobile vehicle, see Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); (4) the search necessitated by exigent circumstances, see Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
14. The discerned bifurcation between search and arrest was natural and in accord
with the precursors of the fourth amendment, which emerged in a period that valued
property interests over personal rights. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-50 (1937); Comment, Watson
and Ramey: The Balance of Interests in Non-Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
838, 844 (1976). In this respect it is significant to note that the United States Supreme Court
has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officer failed
to secure a warrant. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
15. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32
(1963).
16. The theory of interposing the neutral magistrate between the law enforcement
agency and the citizen has been frequently cited by the Supreme Court. E.g., Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Its historical basis, however, is vague. Prior to the
creation of separate police forces in the nineteenth century it was impossible to separate the
criminal-investigatory and judicial powers that the justice of the peace exercised during the
period in which the common law warrant developed. Farrar, supra note 12, at 502. See also
Note, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566 (1936).
17. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (citation omitted).
While this theory has been fully endorsed in search situations, it has
remained substantially dormant in the area of arrest.
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III. Contemporary Opposition to the Search-Arrest Dichotomy
Disregarding this apparent inconsistency in constitutional interpreta-
tion between search and arrest warrant prerequisites, courts continued to
approve warrantless arrest entries on the basis of statute or common
law. 9 The validity of this reasoning, however, has been increasingly
challenged in a series of cases since 1950. This movement had its origin
in the District of Columbia and is represented by a troika of watershed
decisions.20
A. Accarino v. United States-The Emerging Doctrine
Accarino v. United States2' provided the initial divergence from the
common law standard. In Accarino, police had observed the suspect
stopping at the addresses of several known gamblers so as to give the
officers probable cause to believe he was "picking up numbers." 22 Ten
days after the start of the investigation, police broke into Accarino's
apartment and arrested him without benefit of a warrant. 23 In an exhaus-
tive review of common law sources, Judge Prettyman concluded that the
authorities, although inconsistent, condoned the warrantless public arrest
of a felon, but forbade the police from invading the more protected area
of the home, absent a warrant. 24 The court cited McDonald v. United
States25 as recent precedent for its ruling, although in McDonald the
police had conducted a warrantless search in non-exigent circumstances.
While not explicitly stated, Judge Prettyman tacitly equated the require-
ments of a search and an arrest warrant.
In reversing a lower court conviction, the Accarino panel deter-
mined that the police had sufficient time to procure an arrest warrant and
thus held the arrest illegal and the evidence obtained incident to that arrest
inadmissible.26 Again quoting from a decision relating to the propriety of
a search, Judge Prettyman placed the criteria for warrantless entry in the
immediate arrest context.
18. See Justice Powell's discussion of this "certain anomaly" in United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428-30 (1976) (concurring opinion).
19. E.g., Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950). See cases cited in C.E.
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 82 (1974).
20. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); Accarino v.
United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d
1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
21. 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
22. Id. at 456-57.
23. Id. Actually, the police called for Accarino to halt some two or three steps prior to
his entering the apartment. The court refused to recognize the steps as flight to invoke the
doctrine of "hot pursuit" and thus justify the breaking. Id. at 465.
24. Id. at 464. The interpretation is justifiable, but the existence of the "inconsisten-
cy" must be emphasized. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
25. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
26. 179 F.2d at 464.
[N]o matter who the officer is or what his mission, a govern-
ment official cannot invade a private home, unless (1) a magis-
trate has authorized him to do so or (2) an immediate major
crisis in the performance of duty affords neither time nor op-
portunity to apply to a magistrate.
27
Although reasoned soundly and cited favorably by the United States
Supreme Court,28 Accarino was not a fruitful source of precedent in other
jurisdictions.
29
B. Dorman v. United States-The Introduction
of Necessitous Circumstances
The District of Columbia courts, however, adhered to the Accarino
doctrine in a line of similar rulings30 culminating in the seminal case of
Dorman v. United States.31 Dorman essentially entailed an extended
discussion of the second Accarino criterion for warrantless entry. A
police officer, having probable cause to suspect Dorman of participating
in the armed robbery of a clothing store, applied for an arrest warrant.32
The Assistant United States District Attorney 33 soon reported that a
magistrate was not readily available, but that the warrant requirement was
abrogated by the nature of the felony. Pursuant to these instructions, the
officers effected a nonconsensual entry into Dorman's apartment and
arrested him.
In resolving Dorman's contention that the arrest was unreasonable,
the court squarely addressed the fourth amendment issue. Writing for the
court sitting en banc, Judge Leventhal stated that since the fourth amend-
ment protects a right of privacy, the general warrant requirement guaran-
teed by its wording attaches equally to an arrest34-- an act that in a more
recent opinion has been termed "quintessentially a seizure." 35 Rather
than focusing on the physical area, public or private, the opinion empha-
sized the safeguards specifically available to the individual.36
27. Id. (quoting from District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (1949)). The court
in Little balanced the right of privacy in the home with the state interest in conducting health
inspections through an agent of the Office of Health. The opinion found that the former took
precedence subject to possible exigent circumstances.
28. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958). The court noted favorably the
parallel between the judicial doctrine promulgated by Accarino and the statutory require-
ments of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1948) (allowing federal officers the right to break into a residence
and search only when in possession of a warrant).
29. E.g., Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959); People v. Maddox,
46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
30. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958); McKnight v. United
States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
31. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc).
32. Id. at 387.
33. Id. It was established procedure for the officer to submit the request for the arrest
warrant to the designated Assistant United States Attorney, who then had the duty to locate
a judge or magistrate to issue the warrant.
34. Id. at 389.
35. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell J., concurring).
36. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Prior to Katz a great deal of discussion focused on the physical
Reliance was placed on two United States Supreme Court cases. In
Camara v. Municipal Court," Judge Leventhal perceived a trend toward
widening those activities that fall within the warrant requirement 38 as
evidenced by the Court's holding that warrants were necessary for
searches incident to administrative inspections. 39 The circuit court then
noted Chimel v. California,4° a pivotal decision in the realm of search
incident to arrest. Chimel substantially reduced the area available to
police for inspection following a lawful arrest. Previously, as enunciated
in United States v. Rabinowitz,41 the scope of a police search had been
defined only by a vague standard of reasonableness. Chimel narrowed
these boundaries to the more readily delimitable area immediately within
the access of the suspect that might yield weapons, a means of escape, or
an opportunity to destroy evidence.42 The Dorman court viewed this as a
broadening of personal privacy and found it logical to similarly expand
the quantum of protection afforded against intrusions to effect arrest.43
This identity of search and arrest procedures was made manifest in
the court's detailed treatment of those occasions that do not require
procurement of a warrant. That is, the exigent circumstances that would
excuse prior judicial consent are appropriated almost wholly from search
and seizure situations and grafted onto the peculiar requirements of arrest.
Six elements were considered controlling in determining the propriety of
warrantless entry to effect a probable cause arrest: an
1. The graveness of the crime involved.
2. The probability that the suspect is armed.
3. The existence of reasonably trustworthy information be-
yond probable cause.
4. Strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises.
5. A likelihood that the suspect will escape if not quickly
apprehended.
6. The amount of force used in making the entry.
In the instant fact situation, the court found that these criteria had been
fulfilled, particularly with respect to the commission of a crime of
area protected by the fourth amendment and the subjective expectations of the individual
were ignored. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (open fields not
protected); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (private home protected).
Nevertheless, the confusion generated by Katz has been substantial and certain juris-
dictions continue to adhere to what is essentially a location oriented approach. See, e.g.,
People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871,512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. '304 (1973). See generally Note,
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, a Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REv.
468 (1976).
37. 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
38. The perception was erroneous. With the passing of the Warren Court the tendency
has been in substantially the opposite direction.
39. 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967). The Washington District Court had reached the identical
conclusion in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
40. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
41. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
42. 395 U.S. at 762-63.
43. Note Justice White's dissent in Chimel, however, when he observed that arrest
warrants had never been required either statutorily or at common law, regardless of the time
available to obtain one and that the Court had never imposed such a standard. Id. at 777-79
(White, J., dissenting).
44. 435 F.2d at 392-93.
violence and the real possibility of Dorman's imminent escape. 45 While
the lateness of the hour militated for the acquisition of a warrant, 46 Judge
Leventhal found good cause for the precipitous police action.
C. People v. Ramey-The Liberal Extension
The effect of Dorman was far more profound than that of Accarino,
and the number of jurisdictions that have adopted its standards, including
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, has been significant.47 But deference to a
more lax standard of general reasonableness in examining police action
remained evident. The opinions have applied the Dorman criteria in such
a liberal manner that exigent circumstances mandating lawful police entry
are generally recognized. 48 People v. Ramey,49 however, is contrary. In
Ramey, a security guard investigating a burglary in his home went to
defendant's residence and observed what he believed to be the stolen
merchandise as well as an amount of marijuana. He returned three hours
later accompanied by uniformed police officers who lacked arrest war-
rants. 50 When the defendant opened the door from within, the police
entered and arrested Ramey as he was reaching for a concealed weapon.
51
The lower court cited a number of cases that permitted warrantless arrests
in dwelling absent exigent circumstances, 52 but found the point moot
since it perceived such circumstances in the defendant's arrest.
53
45. Id. at 393.
46. Id. The time was 10:20 p.m. on a Friday. This also accounted for the difficulty in
immediately locating a magistrate to issue the warrant. The court decided that there had
been a good faith effort to obtain the warrant, which was a consideration, albeit not a vital
one, in the court's ultimate opinion. In dissent, Judge Wright indicated that in such a brief
time (less than one hour) the United States attorney could not have made a serious attempt
to find a magistrate in a district that contains over 125 judicial officers authorized to issue
warrants. Id. at 403 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Night entries to effect arrest have always been considered peculiarly noisome and are
severely restricted even in those jurisdictions that allow probable cause arrests in a private
dwelling. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at § 120.6(3) and Comment at 313-14.
47. United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North Carolina, 432
F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970). The Ninth Circuit appeared to apply Dorman principles in United
States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974), but later left the issue open in United States
v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1975).
The following courts have apparently adopted Dorman standards either implicitly or
explicitly: Huotari v. Vanderport, 380 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1974); United States v.
Rodriguez, 375 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Tex. 1974); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d
1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488,491 P.2d 575 (1971); Stuck
v. State, 255 Ind. 350, 264 N.E.2d 611 (1970); Commonwealth v. Forde, -Mass. -, 329
N.E.2d 717 (1975); Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179, 321 A.2d 301 (1974).
48. E.g., DeLaCruze v. People, 177 Colo. 46, 492 P.2d 627 (1972) (time too limited to
obtain a warrant); Hailes v. United States, 267 A.2d 363 (D.C. 1970) (early morning hour);
Nilson v. State, 272 Md. 179, 321 A.2d 301 (1974) (time).
49. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
50. Id. at 267-68, 545 P.2d at 1335, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 631. Concerning the failure to
procure a warrant, one of the arresting officers testified, "That is not our practice in
burglary. We just go out there and arrest the people when they're readily available." Id. n.3.
51. Id. at 267-68, 545 P.2d at 1335, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
52. Citing People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974); People
v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970).
53. Of particular import was the probability that the defendant was armed. People v.
Ramey, 47 Cal. App. 3d 866, 873, 121 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40 (1975).
The California Supreme Court reversed on the basis of Dorman and
the absence of necessitous circumstances." With the progeny of Dorman
providing a considerable precedential base, the court pointed directly to
the search-arrest dichotomy:
An intrusion by the state into the privacy of the home for
any purpose is one of the most awesome incursions of police
power into the life of the individual. Unrestricted authority in
this area is anathema to the system of checks envisaged by the
Constitution. It is essential that the dispassionate judgment of a
magistrate, an official dissociated from the "competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime" [citation omitted] be interposed
between the state and the citizen at this critical juncture.5
The court found it incongruous that the protection afforded by the exten-
sive body of law that related to an individual's property in his home was
not extended to the individual. In a decidedly libertarian slant, the
opinion expressed grave fear that granting police the power to invade the
home to arrest might presage the "frightening experience" of further
governmental intrusions. 56 The appeal was obviously emotional,57 but the
theory was sound.
The state's most cogent argument was that in California, as in
most other states, 58 an arrest without a warrant may be made at any
location when there is probable cause. Prior to Dorman this statutory
authority would have been persuasive, but the court summmarily dismis-
sed the contention by observing that no practice may be saved by appeal
to prior, uncritical acceptance. 59 Finally, the opinion was strongly influ-
enced by dicta in Coolidge v. New Hampshire60 and was consequently
severely criticized by the dissent for placing unjustified reliance on
Supreme Court dicta rather than authoritative decisions. 
61
IV. Status of Warrantless, Non-Exigent Felony Arrests in the
United States Supreme Court: Evasive Rulings
The partial reliance of the Ramey court on United States Supreme
Court dicta may have been disturbing to the dissent in that case, but it was
necessary in light of the Court's hesitance to address the issue. Coolidge,
however, clearly constituted the most detailed articulation of the subject
prior to United States v. Watson. 62
54. 16 Cal. 3d at 277, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
55. Id. at 275, 545 P.2d at 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
56. Id.
57. The court quoted Justice Jackson in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)
(dissenting opinion), specifically noting his connection with the Nuremburg War Crimes
Trial; "Essential freedoms are today threatened from without and within. It may become
difficult to preserve here what a large part of the world has lost." Id. at 295.
58. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at Appendix IX.
59. 16 Cal. 3d at 270-75, 545 P.2d at 1337-40, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 633-36. See also United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 430 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
60. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See notes 63-69 and accompanying text infra.
61. 16 Cal. 3d at 277, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (Clark, J., dissenting).
62. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
Coolidge was primarily concerned with the propriety of an auto-
mobile search executed with a defective warrant. Defendant was arrested
at his home pursuant to a warrant signed by the New Hampshire Attorney
General. Concurrent with the issuance of the arrest warrant, the police
obtained a search warrant covering Coolidge's automobile, which was
then parked in his driveway. Following his arrest and removal, the car
was impounded and later towed to the station house where it was ex-
amined.6 3 The defense contended that no exigent circumstances existed
that could have excused the procurement of a proper search warrant.
A divided Court produced a fragmented, confusing opinion with
dubious precedential value. 64 Its prime import came in the already nebul-
ous area of the mobile vehicle exception to the search warrant require-
ment.65 The Court did not reach the arrest issue, since it determined that
search of the car was illegal, even granting the constitutionality of the
initial arrest.' Nonetheless, the Court took the occasion to discuss the
rationale of the warrantless arrest concept and produced the most direct
statement on the topic that it had yet ventured.
It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry
of a man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause is per
se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a
man's house without a warrant are per se unreasonable in the
absence of some one of a number of well defined "exigent
circumstances. "67
The reasoning here is apparent. If the criteria for police entry to arrest
were reduced to a reasonableness--or probable cause-standard, it would
be difficult to perceive why a sweeping, albeit "reasonable," search
incident to that arrest would not also be permissible. Yet, the Court had
previously deemed just such a search unconstitutional in Chimel.68 As the
Court noted in Coolidge, if the entry to arrest, the incident search, and
any search of the automobile were governed solely by probable cause, the
fourth amendment would be read out of the Constitution. 69 It is evident
that the protection afforded by the home from both search and arrest
intrusions should not be forfeit because of the existence of probable
cause.
63. 403 U.S. at 447-49.
64. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and Harlan joined in that portion of
the opinion that deals with dicta on warrantless, non-exigent arrests. Id. at 473-84.
Courts that have cited Coolidge apparently feel obligated to discuss at length the
precedential value of the opinion. See, e.g., People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333,
127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal.3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
65. See notes 127-30 and accompanying text infra. As one court has remarked,
discernment of the "true rule" in automobile search cases would require "the mind of a
medieval scholastic." United States v. Sutton, 341 F. Supp. 320, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
66. 403 U.S. at 455.
67. Id. at 477-78.
68. Id. at 465; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
69. 403 U.S. at 480.
It was not until United States v. Watson70 and United States v.
Santana7 that decisions rather than dicta began to shape the bounds of
warrantless arrest. In Watson, a reliable informant notified the police that
the suspect had sold him a stolen credit card and would offer others at a
specified time and locale. Although the interim of a week afforded the
police time to procure an arrest warrant based on probable cause, they
failed to do so. At the prescribed time the officers surrounded the location
of the second transfer and arrested Watson in a public place. 72 The circuit
court overturned Watson's conviction for stealing from the mails precise-
ly because this failure to obtain a warrant had infringed on Watson's
fourth amendment rights.
73
While the Supreme Court had never addressed the issue of public
probable cause arrests, it found the decision of the Ninth Circuit "unpre-
cedented." 74 As viewed by the majority, the arrest could be sustained on
three bases: first, the historical genesis of the fourth amendment ;75
second, the unanimous agreement of state statutes authorizing probable
cause arrests; 76 last, the influential support of the American Law Insti-
tute. 77 While finding it "preferable" 78 to procure a warrant, the majority
refused to elevate this preference to a constitutional mandate and noted
favorably the report of the American Law Institute that sanctioned such
arrests .7 In concurring, Justice Powell took cognizance of the search-
arrest anomaly, but refused to upset the majority opinion for the simple
expedient of harmonizing search and arrest procedures 80 when such a
decision would abrogate a great mass of statutory law and severely
hamper police activity. 
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70. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
71. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
72. 423 U.S. at 413. The actual exchange during the second rendezvous was not
witnessed by the police. Rather, the informant gave a visual signal at the completion of the
transfer.
73. United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. 423 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. The Court found it highly probative that the Second Congress perceived no
inconsistency between fourth amendment mandates and legislation that granted United
States marshals the same powers as local police officers to arrest for a felony without a
warrant. 423 U.S. at 420. This initial delegation of authority has been continuously renewed,
and the Court cited the numerous acts that empower certain federal officers to make
warrantless arrests. E.g., 18 U.S.C.§ 3052 (1970) (F.B.I. agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1970)
(United States Marshals); 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(2) (1970) (postal inspectors).
76. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at Appendix IX.
77. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at 303.
78. The Court has often expressed this preference for arrest warrants when their
procurement is practicable. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1963).
79. See MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at §§ 120.1, 120.6, which authorizes officers to
arrest on reasonable cause. In commentary, the code draftsmen remarked,
This section does not require an officer to arrest under a warrant even if a
reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant exists. As to arrests on the street such
a requirement would be entirely novel. Moreover, the need for it is not urgent,
and the subsequent inquiry such a requirement would authorize would be indeter-
minate and difficult.
Id. at 303.
80. 423 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. See notes 120-22 and accompanying text infra.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
found this rationale infirm, but could advance only a tenuous counter
argument. Justice Marshall's interpretation that common law authorities
forbade warrantless public arrests appears clearly mistaken. 82 More sub-
stantial was his belief that the privacy of the citizen would be better
protected by a general arrest warrant requirement, a theory that the Court
has commented on favorably, but rejected as an impractical burden on
police operations.83 Unlike the majority, Justice Marshall considered this
burden analysis a spurious shibboleth that imposed no clear impediment
to police investigatory powers.
84
Although the Court's opinion was confined strictly to public arrests,
the dissent noted that a similar synthesis by the Court with respect to
warrantless arrests in dwellings would result in an affirmation of their
validity.85 This apprehension was temporarily allayed in Santana, in
which the Court again contrived to avoid the issue. The police had
observed Santana sell heroin to a third party at Santana's home. The
buyer was arrested as he drove away, and the police, now in possession of
the evidence of the transaction and with probable cause, returned to
defendant's home and arrested her without a warrant.86 Seizing on San-
tana's fortuitous positioning-she straddled the entrance to her home-
the Court merely refined the contours of Watson. Citing Katz v. United
States87 as authority for the extent of fourth amendment applicability, the
majority held that Santana was in a public place and, thus, within the
ambit of Watson principles. 88 Santana's immediate reentry into her
dwelling after having been seen by the police did not frustrate the arrest,
since the "hot pursuit" doctrine permitted police entry following the first
sighting. 89
82. See authorities cited in notes 6 and 9 supra. Justice Marshall also attempted to
demonstrate the distinction between common and statutory felonies to support his conten-
tion. While this distinction is well founded, its applicability to the warrantless arrest issue is
at best tenuous.
83. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528-29 (1967).
84. 423 U.S. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See notes 120-22 and accompanying text
infra.
85. Id. at 454. "Unless the approach of this opinion is to be fundamentally rejected, it
will be difficult, if not impossible, to follow these sources to any but one conclusion-that
entry to effect a warrantless arrest is permissible." Id. The sources referred to by Justice
Marshall are the common law tradition, the recent pronouncements of the American Law
Institute, and the majority of state statutes that deal with warrantless arrest. A selective
reading of the first and emphasis on the last two would support an extension of warrantless
arrest into the home.
86. 427 U.S. at 40.
87. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 351.
88. 427 U.S. at 42.
89. Id. at 2410. By negative implication it would appear that it would not have been
permissible, at least under this opinion, to have entered if Santana had been visible but
wholly within her home. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Again in dissent, Justice Marshall would have resolved the issue on
the existence of exigent circumstances,' but he correctly perceived the
Court's "refinement" to constitute a significant enlargement of the area
available for warrantless arrests. By grafting Katz onto Watson, the
majority had allowed the police freedom to effect warrantless arrests in
private areas so long as the suspect was in open view. 91 This extension
into private lands, but not dwellings, is the most recent and expansive
encroachment on personal privacy made by the Court in the arrest area.
V. The Balance of Policy Interests
The advisability of extending Watson precepts into situations in
which an actual breaking of a dwelling has occurred will hinge on the
balancing of two competing concerns: the individual's interest in max-
imum security within his home, where he has a greater quantum of
protection than in a public area, 92 and the state's legitimate interest in
apprehending felons and maintaining an orderly society.
93
A. Considerations that Militate Against an Extension of Watson
1. Fourth Amendment Inclusiveness.-There is no escape from
the constitutional dictate that searches and seizures must be controlled by
a neutral magistrate to protect the privacy of the individual. It has been
recognized that these principles
apply to all invasions, on the part of the government and its
employees, of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his
drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of ersonal security, personal
liberty, and private property ....
In light of the abuse that so often accompanies the power to arrest, 95 it is
difficult not to recognize such a view. An officer is constitutionally
forbidden to search an individual's room absent exigent circumstances,
even when there is great probable cause to believe the object of the search
is within. Nevertheless, solely because of the officer's perception of
probable cause this same individual may be exposed to the "awesome
and frightening'' 96 experience of arrest while he is ensconced in his
dwelling. The disparity in procedures is not one that may at leisure be
90. See note 117 and accompanying text infra. Santana's knowledge of the buyer's
arrest made immediate seizure of Santana necessary to prevent the possible destruction of
evidence.
91. The Court's rationale for such an extension rested partially on the "open fields"
doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
92. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
93. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
94. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (emphasis added).
95. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
96. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at 290.
"harmonized," but constitutes a serious defect in constitutional protec-
tion.
2. Inadequacy of a Reasonableness Standard.-In search situa-
tions the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the fourth
amendment may not be interpreted apart from its purpose 97 and that a
criterion of "general reasonableness" in the entry to effect warrantless
searches affords little protection. As commentators have noted, 98 adop-
tion of a general reasonableness standard would imply that, apart from
instances of necessity, the fourth amendment is "indifferent" to the
source of the authority to search, and the standard would thus obviate the
very reason for the existence of this authority. The present interpretation,
of course, renders a warrantless search per se unreasonable.
Similarly, reasonableness may not, in a fourth amendment context,
be utilized to validate an intrusion to arrest. The Court has admitted the
necessity for swift judicial determination of probable cause following
arrest to establish whether the subject should be further detained. 99
Although rejecting, in dicta, as impractical a demand that police under all
circumstances obtain a warrant prior to arrest, the Court assumed that
such a process would afford maximum protection to the citizen. 100 While
the benefit is not so certain-issuance of an arrest warrant is often a pro-
forma procedurel°-it is probable that this would result in some measur-
able amount of police deterrence.
This timely hearing to determine probable cause, however, bears a
marked resemblance to the constitutional exclusionary rule as an after-
the-fact remedy, 102 and the effect of the latter as a deterrent to police
misconduct has been seriously assailed.' 03 In a sense, the privacy of the
individual is cloaked with more protection at. the post-arrest hearing in
97. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
One cannot wrench "unreasonable" searches from the text and context and
historic content of the Fourth Amendment. . . . When the Fourth Amendment
outlawed "unreasonable" searches and then went on to define the very restricted
authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the
framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is "unreason-
able" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute
necessity.
Id. The dissent was later vindicated in Chimel.
98. See, e.g., Note, 23 STAN. L. REV. 995, 1003 (1971).
99. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975). "Maximum protection of individual
rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to
any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement." Id.
100. Id.
101. Farrar, supra note 12, at 503.
102. Typically, evidence obtained directly or derivatively from any illegal police action
is inadmissible at trial. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). It is not a personal
constitutional right but a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights through its deterrent effect on future police action. Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
103. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUDIES 243 (1973).
cases of warrantless arrest, since these require a greater quantum of
probable cause and are scrutinized more carefully than are arrests in
which prior judicial consent has issued." ° Nevertheless, this is small
comfort to those taken abruptly from the presumed safety of their home.
3. Interpretation of Necessitous Circumstances.-Imposition of a
stricter entry standard than probable cause would inhibit police investigat-
ory powers only to the extent that the courts desire to strictly construe the
term "exigent circumstances." In search situations the United States
Supreme Court has balanced the particular interests in controversy and
has accordingly varied the degree of exigency required for a warrantless
search.105 When the invasion of the right to privacy is minor, such as a
stop and frisk,1°6 and the possible danger grave-the loss of life, im-
mediate escape of the suspect-the Court has been lenient in sanctioning
the search. If the destruction of evidence or life is not in the balance,
however, and the interest invaded is substantial-a full personal search of
the person or dwelling-the Court has erected stringent barriers to the
warrantless search. 1
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As noted,' 018 the courts adhering to a Dorman rationale have been
relatively tolerant of police practices and have generally found exigent
circumstances in the warrantless entry cases. In those few situations in
which they have not, the police have grossly delayed when a warrant
could have easily been procured. The most recent decisions, however,
appear to impose a stricter definition of necessity. In Ramey, the Su-
preme Court of California found no exigency notwithstanding the lower
court opinion, which believed that the judiciary must not "second-guess"
officers in matters concerning armed, or possibly armed, felons. 109
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Forde"1 ° narrowly construed the necessity criteria. In Forde, a properly
arrested felon was taken into custody along with several other suspects in
his company. Although he was refused bail, he informed his free cohorts
to relay notice of the arrest to the apartment they had visited earlier in the
evening. The police overheard this conversation and were prompted to
immediately dispatch officers, without arrest warrants, to apprehend
104. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948).
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
107. E.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). In Vale, two police officers observed
the suspect selling narcotics, arrested him on his front porch, and proceeded to search his
bedroom, where they discovered a cache of drugs. The state supreme court found the search
justified in light of the easily disposable character of the evidence. The United States
Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the patrolmen had no reason to believe that the
evidence was in any danger of destruction.
108. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
109. People v. Ramey, 47 Cal. App. 3d 866, 874, 121 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40 (1975).
110. -Mass. -, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).
those within the dwelling.'' The state contended that the police arrests
were a spontaneous reaction to the "tip" given by the suspect. The court,
however, found that such an action on the part of the imprisoned was
entirely foreseeable and the police should have taken adequate precau-
tions against it, which included immediately obtaining arrest warrants for
those in the apartment.
112
Regardless of this tentative trend, it remains true that the "heavy
burden" 113 required of the enforcement official to justify a warrantless
arrest in a private dwelling is usually satisfied.
4. Police Indiscretion .- It is desirable to limit police abuse of the
power to arrest as a pretext for a search incident to that arrest. Courts have
often ruled that it is clearly illegal to fabricate an arrest to search the
locality available under the Chimel doctrine. 114 Obviously, the search
must be incident to the arrest, but the temptation to selectively employ a
reverse tactic would be considerable. While a blatant entry into a house to
effect a warrantless search would require both a high degree of probable
cause and great immediate necessity, a warrantless arrest would be
simpler to justify after the fact and may yield potentially valuable infor-
mation, even assuming the release of the suspect after a judicial hearing.
This does not impugn police integrity," 5 but merely recognizes that
overzealous officers, in Justice Jackson's words, occasionally lose sight
of the citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy. 116 Of course, the
imposition of a warrant requirement might well raise the possibility of
"contrived" exigent circumstances, but the danger seems to be accept-
able. "
7
111. Id. at 719.
112. Id. at 720.
113. Dunston v. United States, 315 A.2d 563, 565 (D.C. 1974).
114. See Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1963); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1961).
115. Indeed, in his Coolidge dissent, Justice White believed that this possibility pre-
sented little danger since the Chimel limitations so constrain a search incident to arrest that
the risk of straying outside such boundaries and, thus, losing potentially valuable informa-
tion would be an effective deterrent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 518 (1971)
(White, J., dissenting). As Justice Jackson perceived, however, any extension of police
power must be made with extreme care since "the officers interpret and apply [such
extensions] and will push [them] to the limit." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
116. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
117. The police could circumvent the mandate for a warrant by manipulating the
situation to create the necessity for immediate action. For example, in Santana, the police
arrested the observed buyer of drugs a short distance from the defendant's house and, thus,
rendered it certain that Santana would be quickly alerted to the seizure and possibly gain
time to destroy evidence. 427 U.S. at 40. This was done even though it would have been
possible to arrest the buyer at a more remote point where there was little possibility that the
defendant would learn of the action. While the majority decision failed to reach the issue of
the tactic's propriety, Justice Marshall, in dissent, indicated that the possibility for this type
of abuse was grave. Id. at 2411 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Commonwealth v. Forde, -
Mass. -, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975), the court specifically noted that it did not detect any police
misconduct in creating the purported emergency-the error was one of ineptitude rather
B. Considerations that Support an Extension of Watson
Conversely, the arguments advanced in favor of allowing the police
to enter on probable cause lack substance.
1. Common Law.-The common law provides no firm basis for
such an extension. While established authorities are unanimous in their
approval of a Watson type of public arrest, they are at best inconclusive
as to the propriety of such an arrest in a private dwelling.118 While
constitutional interpretations may be supported by reference to common
law antecedents of the Constitution, no such inference may be drawn
when those sources are ambiguous.
2. Law Enforcement Burden.-While police efficacy in protecting
society is a legitimate concern in an era of increasing violence, it is
specious to posit a decrease in efficacy because of a warrant requirement.
As Justice Marshall noted in Watson, it is the practice of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to present evidence before a magistrate prior to
arrest,119 but this does not appear to significantly lower the efficiency of
that organization. An essentially similar burden rationale was pro-
pounded at the time of the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
120
when it was believed that imposing the requirement of informing a
suspect of his constitutional rights would severely hamper the police in
obtaining confessions and information.' 2 ' No such result has been ob-
served. 1
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3. Staleness.-In applications for a search warrant, the require-
ment demands that present probable cause be demonstrated for the
object's location. 123 Initially it would appear that, if grafted onto the
arrest pattern, this would necessitate that the investigation cease and a
warrant be obtained the moment probable cause crystallizes 124 and would
thus eliminate the possibility of gathering further information through
extended observation. This is erroneous. In a search situation, the exist-
ence of probable cause to believe that a certain object is at a specific
than ingenuity-but the potential for such fabrication was manifest. See notes 110-12 and
accompanying text supra.
118. See authorities cited notes 5 and 6 supra.
119. 423 U.S at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting). FBI procedure has often served as a
model to demonstrate that no undue impediment would result from adoption of a particular
criminal standard.
120. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
121. See the discussion by the Court in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483-89.
122. A recent study has concluded that Miranda had only slight impact on police
investigatory procedures. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of Cri-
minal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 320,
332 (1973).
123. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See generally Mascolo, The Staleness of Probable Cause in
Affidavits for Search Warrants: Resolving the Issue of Timeliness, 43 CONN. B.J. 189 (1969).
124. See, e.g., Godfrey v. United States, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
location obviously decreases with the passage of time from the initial
receipt of the information, particularly if the article is highly portable.' 
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In the case of arrest, since the probable cause is predicated on the
immediate suspicion of an ineradicable crime, it necessarily continues
indefinitely, so long as no exculpatory facts are discovered in the in-
terim.'26 The issue of staleness is insubstantial in the arrest area.
4. The Moving Vehicle Analogy.-The most substantial charge
levelled against the Dorman standard is represented by the analogy
between the individual and the mobile vehicle search exception establish-
ed by the United States Supreme Court. 127 Since Carroll v. United
States,128 the Court has articulated a distinction between the search of a
home and that of an automobile, citing the ability of the latter to be
"quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought." 1 29 Thus, an officer may search an automobile without a
warrant, but with probable cause, when he could not effect the search of a
house with that identical amount of probable cause.
1 30
Application of this standard to other "movable" items has yielded
mixed results in different jurisdictions.' 31 The California Supreme Court
examined the problem in People v. McKinnon.' 32 Defendant attempted to
transport five cartons by air freight and consigned them to a company
agent. The agent opened one of the cartons on suspicion, believed that the
contents were marijuana, and informed the police. The officers confirmed
the speculation, arrested McKinnon, and opened the remainder of the
cartons. 1
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125. E.g., Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1968); People v.
Montgomery, 27 II1. 2d 404, 189 N.E.2d 327, 328 (1963). A lapse of over seven weeks, for
instance, almost invariably voids the warrant. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 525, 527 (1965).
126. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wilson v. United States, 325 F.2d 224
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (delay of ten months between formation of probable cause and issuance of
arrest warrant held permissible). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
127. See generally Note, Warrantless Search and Seizures ofAutomobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 835 (1974).
128. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
129. Id. at 153.
130. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968).
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court found that even though the
automobile in point had been taken to a police station and searched, the warrantless invasion
was permissible since at the time of the initial seizure a search would have been proper. Id.
at 52. This was later arguably narrowed by Coolidge when the Court held that the motor
vehicle exception was inapposite when there was no real danger of movement prior to
procurement of a warrant. 403 U.S. at 462. In Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), however,
the Court, over objections by Justices Marshall and Brennan, apparently reaffirmed the
Chambers standard and did not indorse the splintered Coolidge rationale.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1972), and United States
v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (suitcases); People v.
McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973), and People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970) (cartons and footlockers).
132. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
133. Id. at 902-04, 500 P.2d at 1099-1100, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
The court of appeals found the police search unjustifiable. 13 4 The
California Supreme Court reversed and upheld the search as reasonable,
relying on the Carroll-Chambers line of cases. Noting United States
Supreme Court opinions that refer not only to automobiles, but other
movable objects as well,' 3 5 the court concluded that limiting the excep-
tion to "self-propelled" vehicles was irrational and that a clear distinc-
tion existed between fixed property and other transportable items, regard-
less of whether the latter had their own means of locomotion. 136 While in
the instant case the court stressed the issuance to a common carrier as
evidence of mobility, the apparent implication is that the mere possibility
of movement gives rise to a justifiable search, aside from the fact of
custody by one in the business of moving such items.' 
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The three dissenting justices considered this extension of Carroll
unwarranted. Rather, they found that the Supreme Court decisions em-
phasized the removal of the vehicle from the locality.' 3 8 Applying both
Carroll and Coolidge, Justice Peterson perceived that the point of re-
ference was the vehicle that contained the object in question rather than
the object itself. 1
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If the McKinnon majority decision is to be followed, this concept of
inherent mobility that creates a per se exception to the search warrant
requirement would apply with greater force to a completely mobile
individual. '" Grafting such an exception onto arrest requirements would,
134. People v. McKinnon, 13 Cal. App. 3d 555,558-60,91 Cal. Rptr. 696,698-99(1971).
The court reasoned that even if Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), distinguished
between fixed premises and movable items in establishing search warrant criteria, the states
were free to adopt a more stringent requirement. Moreover, in this case the state had failed
to demonstrate any lack of time in which to produce a warrant. The decision relied heavily
on People v. McGrew, I Cal. 3d 404,462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969), in which the search
of two footlockers deposited for shipment by a common carrier was invalidated.
135. E.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964). "Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of motor
cars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of
searches of fixed structures like houses." Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
136. 7 Cal. 3d at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
137. Id. at 910, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Carried to its logical, if not
practical extreme, such a theory would encompass all potentially movable objects within its
ambit.
138. Id. at 922, 500 P.2d at 1113, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Peters, J. dissenting).
139. Id. It is unprofitable to analyze the cartons of McKinnon with the individual in
arrest situations. Focusing on the object being placed in the hands of a common carrier
might be likened to a suspect being observed to engage some type of transportation, but this
is a tenuous link. For a discussion of the feasibility of grafting the mobile vehicle search
exception onto other movable items see Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll
Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1134 (1973).
140. People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) (Clark, J.
dissenting).
On the one hand, they [the majority] hold that an automobile's characteristic
mobility justifies a warrantless search . . . .On the other hand, they hold that
police may not arrest a man in his home until a warrant is obtained. . . .An
automobile is mobile only in so far as it is set in motion by a man. Nevertheless, in
the circumstances of Coolidge, the majority would seize the car and allow the
man to escape!
Id. at 280, 545 P.2d at 1344, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
however, effectively engulf any proposed warrant standard, since rarely
is the individual not completely mobile. 14 Ultimately, this analogy must
fail on two points. First, the criteria propounded by the Dorman opinion
specifically establish that the probability of the suspect's escape must be
considered in determining the need to make a warrantless arrest. 42 The
exception here is not the inherent mobility, but the likelihood that such
mobility will be employed. 14 3 This probability must be ascertained from
the objective evidence presented. In arrest situations it would appear
more reasonable to conclude that the issue of flight is determined by the
particular circumstances rather than by arbitrary classifications of mobile
and fixed.
Second, when the mobile vehicle search exception is analogized to
an individual arrest, the rights of the citizen are effectively reduced to
those of a chattel. Supporting this search exception, the United States
Supreme Court has deemed the invasion of an automobile a lesser intru-
sion into personal privacy than the search of the person or dwelling. 144
The far more obtrusive invasion engendered by arrest should hardly be
regulated by identical requirements.
VI. Conclusion
It is unfortunate that the resolution of this vital question of personal
privacy has devolved to the lower courts. Nevertheless, despite the
Supreme Court's manifest reluctance to rule on the issue in Santana, the
rationale employed by the majority in Watson would indicate that given a
clear factual presentation, warrantless arrests in private dwellings would
be deemed constitutionally valid. While the common law would provide
ambiguous support, the almost uniform concurrence of state statutes and
the authoritative guidance of the American Law Institute would form the
basis of the decision. Moreover, the Court's recent approval of nocturnal
search warrants indicates a predisposition toward tolerating a broader
range of police intrusions.145 This is consonant with the Court's general
attitude toward limiting the substantial fourth amendment protection
accorded in large part by the Warren Court. '46
This is a grievous error. The existence of a serious anomaly between
search and arrest warrant requirements is not an academic question, but
one that involves fundamental constitutional rights. The Dorman stand-
141. See the dissenting opinion in McKinnon.
If all things movable could be searched without a warrant if there were probable
cause . . . the Fourth Amendment would be rendered nugatory, and in effect the
search without a warrant would become the rule rather than the exception.
7 Cal. 3d at 923, 500 P.2d at 1113, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Peters, J. dissenting).
142. 435 F.2d at 393.
143. This is in harmony with the Coolidge standard, which demands that there be a real
possibility of movement before the search warrant may be dispensed with.
144. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).
145. See Goodyling v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
146. See 19 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1067.
ard represents a more rational accommodation between the competing
interests of individual privacy and state necessity, and the six guidelines
proposed in that opinion should be employed to determine necessity. At
the earliest opportunity, therefore, the Court should rule that forcible
entry to effect a warrantless arrest in nonexigent circumstances is per se
unconstitutional.
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